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Introduction
‣ Rise in home foreclosures
‣ Subprime mortgage crises
‣ Housing finance affecting financial markets and 
global economy
‣ Mortgage credit risk determined by outstanding 
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LTV
‣ Key questions:
‣ What determines borrowing propensity?
‣ What are determinants of outstanding LTV?
‣ What is the role of mortgage type?
‣ What is the link between homeownership and housing 
finance?
Data
‣ DNB Household Survey carried out by CentERdata 
(Tilburg University)
‣ Period: 1992–2005
‣ Rotating panel of 8,867 representative Dutch 
households (30,803 obs.)
AREUEA 2008 - Determinants of Outstanding Mortgage Loan to Value Ratios 3
‣ Why Netherlands?
‣ High level of financial sophistication of Dutch households 
(Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest (2002))
‣ Very well developed mortgage market  (Kuijpers and  
Schotman (2006))
‣ Broad scope and high quality of the data (cf. Campbell (2006))
‣ Homogenous w.r.t. economic and legal factors
Holland and Housing Trends
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Some facts and observations
‣ Increasing house prices – declining affordability
‣ Mortgage debt counting for 94% of homeowners’ 
external financing; real estate about 80% of assets
‣ Primarily fixed rate debt
‣ Many different mortgage types
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‣ Unlike firms: no stationary LTV target
‣ Wide variation: LTVit = 0.479 (St. dev. = 0.275)‣ 20% of homeowners having no mortgage debt
‣ LTV dispersion increasing with time
Some facts and observations
‣ LTV declining over mortgage life-cycle:
‣ Amortization (influenced by mortgage type)
‣ House price appreciation (if no equity release)
‣ Repayment versus non-repayment mortgages:
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‣ Outstanding LTV on average higher for non-repayment 
mortgages (NRPMT)
‣ LTV declining faster for repayment mortgages (RPMT)
Some facts and observations
‣ Mortgage to income ratio:
‣ RPMT: constant at 1.7
‣ NRPMT: 1.96 (in 1992) to 3.32 (in 2005)
‣ Outstanding loan to initial loan ratio:
‣ RPMT: 0.77
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‣ NRPMT: 0.96 to 1.05
‣ Proliferation of NRPMT in recent years:
‣ Interest-only mortgages: up from 0% to 36%
‣ RPMT: down from 37% to 13%
Regression analysis
1. Model of borrowing propensity: Prob (LTVit > 0)
‣ Controlling for sample selection (subsample of owners)
2. Model of outstanding LTVit (for mortgage holders)
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3. Model of mortgage type: Prob (NRPTM = 1)
Regression analysis
Borrowing Propensity: Prob(LTVit > 0)
‣ Endogeneity of sample selection taken into 
account (financing decisions relevant only to 
owners)
AREUEA 2008 - Determinants of Outstanding Mortgage Loan to Value Ratios 9
‣ Problem modelled using Heckman probit methodology
Regression analysis
Borrowing Propensity: Prob(LTVit > 0)
‣ Model specification:
with
OWN*it = X1it α + εit
BORROW*it = X2it β + ζit ,
OWN ≡ 1 if OWN*it > 0
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and
εit , ζit – error term drawn from bivariate normal distribution
y*it – non-observable, yit – observable 
it  
2 if OWN*it ≤ 0
BORROWit≡
1 if BORROW*it  > 0
0 if BORROW*it ≤ 0
Not observed if OWN*it ≤ 0
Regression analysis
Borrowing Propensity: Prob(LTVit > 0)
‣ εit (ζit) are iid between different households over 
time, but not necessarily for different 
observations within the same household
AREUEA 2008 - Determinants of Outstanding Mortgage Loan to Value Ratios 11
‣ Covariance between εit and ζit is non-zero
‣ Adjustment for sample selection is needed (and 
made) 
Regression analysis
Outstanding LTVit and mortgage type (Prob(NRPMT = 1))
‣ Outstanding LTVit:
‣ Fixed effects model (to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across households)
‣
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LTVit at any time t
LTVit = γX3it + ηit
‣ Mortgage type: Prob(NRPMT = 1)
‣ Probit model
Results
Sample selection model (Homeownership)
‣ Dependent variable: Homeownership dummy
Variable Unit ∆ Prob
Income EUR 10000 0.015
Net worth EUR 10000 0.019
Benefits EUR 10000 -0.052
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2nd household member dummy 0.061
3rd (or more) member dummy 0.069
Education dummy 0.032
Low urbanization dummy 0.039
Housing type dummy -0.071
Relative cost of renting 0.1 0.003
Calendar time year 0.003
Results
Sample selection model (Homeownership)
‣ Ownership propriety is:
‣ Inverted U curve of age (max. at 40)
‣ Increasing in average tax rate
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‣ Lower the highly-urbanized areas
Results
Borrowing model (Prob(LTV >0))
‣ Dependent variable: Borrowing dummy
Variable Unit ∆ Prob
Income 0.1 -0.014
Net worth EUR 10000 -0.010
Benefits 0.1 -0.038
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2nd household member dummy 0.108
3rd (or more) member dummy 0.121
Education dummy 0.076
Low urbanization dummy 0.037
Effective tax rate (untill ’97) 0.1 0.056
Results
Borrowing model (Prob(LTV > 0))
‣ Income and benefits are scaled by house value
‣ Borrowing propensity is an inverted U-shaped 
function of age
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‣ Error terms of both regressions are positively 
correlated
Results
LTV regression (for LTV it > 0)
‣ Dependent variables: Loan to value ratio
Variable Unit Sensitivity
Net worth EUR 10000 -0.011
Benefits (RPMT) 1 0.592
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Benefits (NRPMT) 1 0.369
2nd household member Dummy 0.022
3rd (or more) member Dummy 0.022
Education Dummy -0.005
Effective tax rate (until ’97) 1 0.046
Calendar time year -0.005
NRPMT Dummy 0.047
Results
LTV regression (for LTVit > 0)
‣ Repayment schedule is compulsory (discretionary) 
for repayment (non-repayment) mortgages
‣ Marginal effect of income values with mortgage 
type:
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‣ RPMT: 18 cent more debt per extra 10k euro of income
‣ NRPMT: 12 cent less debt per extra 10k euro of income
‣ RPMT: constant marginal effect over time
‣ NRPMT: decreasing marg. effect (-0.056 at T=0; -0.339 at T=30)
‣ RPMT: income only determines initial debt level
‣ NRPMT: extra income accelerates repayment (which is 
discretionary)
Results
LTV regression (for LTVit > 0)
‣ LTV is a convex decreasing function of mortgage 
elapsed time:
‣ Effect of house price appreciation
‣ RPMT: 1.09% decline per year
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‣ NRPMT: 0.81% decline per year
‣ LTV significantly higher for non-repayment 
mortgages:
‣ Results also hold for individual mortgage types
‣ Difference increases with time elapsed since mortgage 
commencement
Results
LTV regression (for LTVit > 0)
‣ Indication that their relatively high LTV may be 
associated with a selection of non-compulsory 
principal repayment types
‣ Non-repayment mortgages are riskier
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‣ What caused proliferation of non-repayment 
mortgages?
Results
Probit model for mortgage type (Prob(NRPMT = 1))
‣ Dependent variable: Mortgage type (NRPMT = 1)
Variable Unit ∆ Prob
Income 0.1 -0.009
Net worth EUR 10000 -0.0003
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2nd household member dummy 0.109
3rd (or more) member dummy 0.112
Age year -0.017
Effective tax rate (until ’97) 0.01 0.004
Calendar time year 0.028
Affordability 0.1 -0.018
Results
Probit model for mortgage type (Prob(NRPMT = 1))
‣ NRPMT mortgages chosen by households that are 
more likely to be financially constrained (low net 
worth, large family)
‣ Proliferation of non-repayment mortgages driven 
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by:
‣ Declining affordability
‣ Tax advantages
‣ Increased banking competition
Conclusions
‣ Mortgage financing being practically the only 
source of external financing
‣ Loan-to-value ration decreasing much faster for 
contracts with compulsory principal repayment
‣ Potential implications of the prevalence of non-
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compulsory repayment mortgages for future 
homeownership rates
‣ Endogeneity of sample selection taken into 
account
